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FOREWORD
Ukaraine is located at a pivotal crossroads in Europe between
east and west and has the potential to play an important role in
combatting terrorism in two ways. First, by consolidating democracy
and democratic control over its armed forces, Ukraine can be a
stabilizing force in Eurasia. Second, the country can contribute
toward the defeat of terrorism by developing niche capabilities,
particularly in its peacekeeping forces.
Dr. Deborah Sanders, the author of this External Research
Associates Program (ERAP) monograph, argues that for Ukraine
to be an effective U.S. ally in the war on terror, it must engage in
comprehensive military transformation. Such a transformation
depends on developing its military professionalism, democratic
political control, and democratic professionalism. She also contends
that Ukraine must consolidate democracy and develop good relations
with its neighbors, beginning with the Russian Federation, to fulfill
its potential as an ally.
Dr. Sanders examines Ukraine’s progress in these crucial areas
and provides recommendations for the U.S. Government, the U.S.
military, and the international community to assist that country
in accomplishing its military and democratic transformation. The
Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this ERAP monograph
as a contribution to the national security debate on this strategic
issue.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute

iii

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR
DEBORAH SANDERS is Senior Lecturer in Defence Studies at
King’s College London located at the Joint Services Command and
Staff College in the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, where
she specializes in relations between Russia and Ukraine since their
independence. Since 2001 she has widened her research interests
to include security sector reform and military transformation in
Ukraine and the Newly Independent States of the former Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics. In recognition of her research interest
in security sector reform in Ukraine and Russia, Dr. Sanders was
awarded a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO-EAPC)
Fellowship to conduct research into how foreign military assistance
programs facilitate mature and stable relations between Russia and
Ukraine. She regularly visits Ukraine and is currently working on
Ukraine’s contribution to stability and security in the Black Sea. Dr.
Sanders was awarded her doctorate from Aberystwyth University
and subsequently published her thesis entitled Security Cooperation
between Russia and Ukraine in the Post-Soviet Era with Palgrave in
2001.

iv

SUMMARY
Located at the crossroads of Europe between east and west,
Ukraine’s pivotal location and recent path towards democracy mean
that this state has the potential to play an important role in the global
coalition in combatting both regional and international terrorism.
Ukraine can contribute to the U.S.-led struggle against international
terrorism in two ways. First, the consolidation of democracy and
democratic control over its armed forces will allow Ukraine to be
a force for stability in the Eurasian region. It will give Ukraine the
authority and credibility to play a diplomatic and peacekeeping role in
frozen conflicts in the former Soviet Union—where conflict resolution
has yet to take place. Ukraine can make a second contribution to the
U.S.-led defeat of international terrorism through the development
of niche capabilities—in particular its peacekeeping forces.
The author argues that, if Ukraine is to realize its potential as
an effective U.S. ally in the war on terror, it needs to engage in
comprehensive military transformation. This will necessitate
the reform of all security stakeholders—all those organizations
responsible for the provision of security in Ukraine. Effective military
transformation in Ukraine will be dependent on the development of
military professionalism, democratic political control, and democratic
professionalism. Professional militaries are efficient, well-equipped,
and highly motivated modern forces whose institutions and internal
structures reflect democratic civilian control. Democratic control
would ensure that all security stakeholders are accountable through
the democratic structures in Ukraine; this would include both
constitutional limits and accountability to the executive branch,
legislative branch, and Ukrainian society. Democratic professionalism is an important benchmark used to determine progress in military
transformation and the extent to which Ukraine can contribute to
the war on terror. Democratic professionalism is the development of
new styles of leadership and promotion in Ukraine so that military
commanders have the confidence and flexibility to make timely
decisions in a complex battlespace such as stabilization operations
in Iraq. The author argues that Ukraine has made considerable



progress in developing military professionalism, democratic political
control, and democratic professionalism in the military sphere, but
has made far less progress in reforming its security services.
Successful military transformation will allow Ukraine to
provide niche capabilities, in particular well-trained and equipped
peacekeeping troops able to contribute to the international struggle
for peace and stability. Ukraine has made considerable progress
in developing effective and professional peacekeeping forces.
However, it is clear that, at present, Ukrainian peacekeeping forces
lack the training and capability to perform strategic or more complex
peacekeeping operations. Stabilization operations in Iraq have
demonstrated that there is a need for future coalition members to
develop the capability for full-spectrum military activities beyond
traditional peacekeeping. The changing nature of contemporary
conflicts means that members of the international community have
to be able to deploy forces that are able to engage simultaneously
in all aspects of strategic peacekeeping—peace building, peace
enforcement, and traditional tasks related to maintaining the
peace. A case study of Ukrainian peacekeepers in Iraq suggests that
these forces currently lack the capability and training for anything
more than rigid adherence to traditional as opposed to strategic
peacekeeping tasks. The author argues that effective and well-funded
military transformation in Ukraine will give the Ukrainian forces the
capability to perform more complex tasks in support of the war on
terror.
The author argues that Ukraine’s ability to perform future military
tasks in support of the war on terror also will be contingent on the
consolidation of democracy and the development of good relations
with neighbors. Ukraine has made some notable progress in the
consolidation and building of its democratic and electoral institutions
since the Orange Revolution at the end of 2004. Ukraine has a
flourishing civic society and increasingly a free press. Democratization in Ukraine, which will provide one of the key catalysts for progress in military transformation, may mean, however, that Ukraine
lacks the political commitment and domestic support necessary to
deploy forces into high-risk environments. Increased democratic
political control, accountability, and oversight could limit the
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discretion of the Ukrainian Government to deploy its military in
support of the war on terrorism. More democratic and inclusive
political control over peacekeeping activities could limit the range
of activities and the type of operations Ukraine will commit to in the
future.
Ukraine’s geo-strategic environment also affects the pace and
shape of military transformation and the consolidation of democracy.
The author argues that the parameters and possibilities of military
change will be affected by the degree to which Ukraine maintains
good relations with its neighbors—not least of which the Russian
Federation. Russian interference in Ukraine’s presidential election
in 2004 and disagreement over the price of Russian-supplied gas in
early 2006 have strained relations between these two states. Russia
and Ukraine also have a number of unresolved and contentious
legacy issues that hamper the prospects for the normalization of
relations in the short to medium term. These include the speed and
shape of the Single Economic Space and the conditions under which
the Russian fleet remains in Ukraine’s Black Sea port, Sevastopol.
Ukraine’s foreign policy objectives connected with Euro-Atlantic
integration will facilitate military transformation, but this ultimately
could damage relations further with Russia. Deterioration in
relations could lead to the reemphasis of traditional definitions of
defense rather than the development of niche capabilities such as
peacekeeping forces, thus hampering Ukraine’s ability to contribute
to the war on terror.
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UKRAINE AFTER THE ORANGE REVOLUTION:
CAN IT COMPLETE MILITARY TRANSFORMATION
AND JOIN THE U.S.-LED WAR ON TERRORISM?
INTRODUCTION
“Razom nas Bahato! Nas ne podolaty!” The rhythmic chant spread
through the crowd of hundreds of thousands that filled Kiev’s
Independence Square on the evening of November 22 [2004]. “Together,
we are many! We cannot be defeated!” Emerging from a sea of orange,
the mantra signalled the rise of a powerful civic movement, a skilled
political opposition group, and a determined middle class that had come
together to stop the ruling elite from falsifying an election and hijacking
Ukraine’s presidency.
Over the next 17 days, through harsh cold and sleet, millions of
Ukrainians staged nationwide nonviolent protests that came to be
known as the “orange revolution.” The entire world watched, riveted
by this outpouring of the people’s will in a country whose international
image had been warped by its corrupt rulers. By the time victory was
announced—in the form of opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko’s
electoral triumph—the orange revolution had set a major new landmark
in the postcommunist history of eastern Europe.
Adrian Karatnycky1

Launched almost 5 years ago, the Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT) is a U.S.-led campaign with the twin aims of ending
international terrorism through the defeat of terrorist groups, and
ending state sponsorship of terrorism. This protracted struggle has
taken many forms, ranging from U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan
and Iraq to the promotion of democracy in unstable regions. There is
a recognition within the U.S. Government that, ultimately, progress
in defeating terrorist networks and groups, as well as ending state
sponsorship of terrorism, will be dependent upon the “sustained
efforts of a global coalition.”2
Located at the crossroads of Europe between east and west,
Ukraine’s pivotal location and recent path towards democracy mean
that this state has the potential to play an important role in the global
coalition in combatting both regional and international terrorism.


Ukraine can contribute to the U.S.-led struggle against international
terrorism in two ways. First, the consolidation of democracy and
democratic control over its armed forces will allow Ukraine to be
a force for stability in the Eurasian region. It will give Ukraine the
authority and credibility to play a diplomatic and peacekeeping
role in “frozen conflicts” in the former Soviet Union. Ukraine can
make a second contribution to the U.S.-led defeat of international
terrorism through the development of its peacekeeping forces.
However, if Ukraine is to realize its potential as an effective U.S.
ally in the war on terrorism, it needs to make considerable progress
in its military transformation. Successful military transformation,
which intrinsically is linked to democratization in Ukraine, will
allow Ukraine to continue to provide niche capabilities, with welltrained and fully equipped peacekeeping troops able to contribute to
the international struggle for peace and stability.
The Ukrainian government clearly is interested in realizing this
potential to contribute to the war on terrorism. The new Ukrainian
president, Viktor Yushchenko, has confirmed his government’s
commitment to fighting international terrorism. After the bomb
attacks in London in July 2005, Yushchenko stated that terrorism was
“a common challenge for every country which requires a common
solution.”3 He called on all countries of the world to unite to stop
the threat of terrorism. Then in September 2005, Ukraine signed the
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism at the United Nations (UN) Summit.4 In a statement after
the signing, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk stressed
Ukraine’s readiness to cooperate with the international community
in developing and implementing effective and practical measures to
combat the terrorist threat.5
In theory, then, Ukraine has a role to play as a U.S. partner in
combatting terrorism. However, declarations of political support do
not equate automatically to a substantial capability to act. The author
argues that progress in military and democratic transformation will
be important factors in determining the extent to which Ukraine will
be a reliable partner in the struggle against terrorism. The shape of
military transformation also will affect the nature of the military
contribution that Ukraine can make, especially in the provision of



niche capabilities such as peace support operations. Ukraine has
made considerable progress towards developing effective, welltrained, and professional peacekeeping forces able to contribute to
stabilization operations as required by the international community
to facilitate peace and stability. However, it is clear that, at present,
Ukrainian forces lack the training and capability to perform
“strategic peacekeeping” operations.6 Stabilization operations in
Iraq have demonstrated that there is a need for future coalition
members to develop the capability for full-spectrum military
activities beyond traditional peacekeeping. The changing nature of
contemporary conflicts means that there is a need for members of
the international community to deploy forces that are able to engage
in peace building, peace enforcement, and traditional peacekeeping
roles simultaneously. Currently, Ukrainian peacekeepers lack the
capability and training for anything more than rigid adherence to
traditional peacekeeping tasks. Effective and well-funded defense
reform in Ukraine will give the Ukrainian forces the capability to
perform more complex tasks and be a more reliable partner in the
war on terror. Paradoxically, however, democratization in Ukraine,
which will provide one of the key catalysts for greater military
effectiveness, may weaken its political commitment to deploy forces
into high-risk environments.
WHAT CAN UKRAINE CONTRIBUTE
TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM?
This section begins by examining in greater detail what Ukraine
can contribute to the war on terrorism. Broadly, the contribution
lies in two areas: (1) Ukraine can play an important role as a force
for stability in the Eurasian region; and (2) it can provide niche
capabilities such as peacekeeping forces. The publication of the U.S.
National Security Strategy (NSS) in March 2006 provides a useful
indication of the important contribution Ukraine can make to U.S.
attempts to defeat global terrorism and to prevent future terrorist
attacks. Section III of the NSS outlines how, in the long run, winning
the war on terror means winning what is referred to as the battle
of ideas through promoting and encouraging democracy, freedom,



and human dignity. Ukraine has made some notable progress in
building its democracy, suggesting that it is no longer a “state of
concern,” but, more importantly, that it can promote freedom,
dignity, and democracy in the region by example. In addition to
providing peacekeeping troops to regional conflict zones, Ukraine
can play a positive diplomatic and military role in “frozen conflicts”
in the former Soviet Union, such as those in Trans-Dniester,
Abkhazia, and Nagorny Karabakh. These are conflicts in which the
use of force has ended and conflict termination has been achieved,
but conflict resolution has yet to take place. The NSS outlines how
important defusing regional conflicts is in the fight against terrorism.
It suggests that, if conflicts are not addressed, they can lead to failed
states, which can become safe havens for terrorists. A democratic
Ukraine with an effective and reformed military and security sector
could play an important diplomatic and military role in conflicts in
the former Soviet Union. These regional conflicts provide numerous
opportunities for the growth of organized crime and terrorism and
a strengthening nexus between the two due to a significant number
of ethnic conflicts and the density of criminal and terrorist groups
in the region. As the U.S. Department of Justice notes, it is evident
that, in the Black Sea region, “instability, as well as growing ties
between ethnic minorities engaged in political struggles, have made
the region a useful one for terrorists to operate within.”7
For example, Trans-Dniester, the tiny separatist enclave that
broke away from the Republic of Moldova in 1991, shares a land
border with Ukraine and has long been seen as an economic black
hole through which all types of contraband move.8 The head of the
Ukrainian Security Services Ihor Drizhchanyy has noted the threat
from Moldova, stating that the “Dniester is a region with a very
complex crime and socio-economic situation in which a large number
of shadow and criminal structures operate. The law enforcement
bodies are waging a fight against them, but in our view, it is not
effective enough.”9 In March 2006, Ukraine signaled its willingness
to deal firmly with the threat from Dniester when it imposed new
customs regulations on the enclave. In a further sign that Ukraine
is willing to use both diplomatic and military tools to deal with
regional threats, Ukraine also has agreed to send peacekeepers to the



disputed enclave of Nagorny Karabakh if international agreement
can be reached. Secretary of the National Security and Defense
Council Anatoly Kinakh stressed that “Ukraine will stand for
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and back peaceful and democratic
settlement of the problem.”10 In August 2005, the new government
in Kiev again demonstrated its commitment to dealing with regional
terrorist challenges when the secretary of the National Security and
Defense Council held a meeting with the head of the Russian Foreign
Intelligence Service. The two neighbors met to discuss new forms
of cooperation in fighting terrorism, organized crime, and the drug
trade.11
Ukraine can make a second contribution to the war on terrorism—
through the development of niche capabilities, it can continue to
be an active provider of peacekeeping troops to zones of conflict.
Niche capabilities can be defined as “high-demand, low-density,
and technologically-advanced military assets that are deployable,
interoperable, and sustainable.”12 Capabilities provided by Ukraine
could improve the effectiveness of future coalition operations
and enhance their legitimacy. Ukraine has been a long and active
supporter of peacekeeping operations, with its service personnel
having performed peacekeeping missions in Eastern Slovenia,
Macedonia, Angola, Abkhazia, Guatemala, Tajikistan, and Lebanon.
Ukraine has played an important role in NATO-led peacekeeping
in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Kosovo. The Ukrainian
government demonstrated its commitment to the U.S.-led defeat of
international terrorism when it deployed a chemical and biological
decontamination unit to Kuwait during the first phase of the U.S.led invasion of Iraq. Indicating the new government’s support for
the provision of niche capabilities, Ukrainian transport aircraft have
provided airlift for cargo and peacekeepers in Afghanistan. Former
President Leonid Kuchma further signaled Ukraine’s military
commitment to defeat terrorism and promote peace and stability
when he authorized the deployment of 1,600 Ukrainian peacekeeping troops to the Polish-controlled sector of Iraq. Ukraine also
is engaged in cooperation with NATO in the fight against terrorism.
Ukraine has recently pledged its support to Operation ACTIVE
ENDEAVOR, NATO’s maritime operations in the Mediterranean



launched on a U.S. initiative after the September 11, 2001 (9/11),
terrorist attacks.13 This operation involves navies from Germany,
Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom
(UK), and the United States, which monitor ships on order to deter
criminal and terrorist activity in the region.14
However, Ukraine’s ability to perform future military and
diplomatic tasks in support of the war on terrorism will be contingent
on building a professional military and security service, consolidating
its democracy, and developing good relations with its neighbors. If
Ukraine can make significant progress in these areas, it will be better
able to participate in the diverse range of security, military, and
diplomatic operations required by the international community to
enhance peace and stability.
UKRAINE’S MILITARY TRANSFORMATION
This section begins by examining what Ukraine needs to do to
achieve a successful military transformation so that it can make a
positive contribution to the GWOT, and what internal and external
factors might affect this process. It then examines progress made
by the new government based on information from interviews
conducted in Kiev in April 2006 and the careful analysis of official
documents.15 By means of a case study of the attack by Al Sadr forces
on the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) compound in Wasit
province in Iraq, focusing on the role played by Ukranian forces,
the last part of this section examines just how much real progress
Ukraine has made in developing democratic professional forces and
democratic political control.
Military transformation can be defined as “a strategy designed
purposefully to achieve a cogent vision of the future.”16 As is well
known and frequently remarked, the U.S. military itself is currently
undergoing military transformation. The aim of this military
transformation is to enable the United States to achieve three key
goals: win the GWOT; build efficient fighting forces; and prepare for
future wars.17 It is a process aimed at developing forces capable of
defending U.S. security and interests, as well as swiftly defeating an
enemy.18



The Ukrainian government has stated that the two key goals
of military transformation in its case are Euro-Atlantic integration
and acquiring the ability to provide support to international
peacekeeping operations. In order to meet these objectives and be
an effective contributor to the defeat of terrorism, Ukraine will need
to undertake, first and foremost, the development of professional
military forces. Professional militaries are those accepting that “their
role is to fulfil the demands of the civilian government of the states
and are capable of undertaking military activities in an effective and
efficient way and whose organization and internal structures reflect
these assumptions.”19 These guidelines are important because military
effectiveness is predicated on efficient well-equipped and modern
forces that are highly motivated. This definition of professionalism
offers an ideal type of military professionalism and a number of
important benchmarks for successful military transformation. It
suggests that one of the key elements of professionalism is the
development of forces that are capable of defending the state and
engaging in a range of missions determined by the Ukrainian
government. Such capabilities will necessitate a fundamental
restructuring and reorganization of its fighting power and, more
importantly, the development of an effective, well-equipped, and
fully trained peacekeeping contingent.
Successful military transformation in Ukraine, with the aim of
achieving Euro-Atlantic integration, also is dependent on creating
democratic control of all security stakeholders.20 Thus military
transformation requires not just reform of the military, but broader
security sector reform. The concept of security sector reform reflects
the new security environment in which states find themselves
facing external, internal, and asymmetrical threats. The old borders
between domestic and external security, and between the different
security forces, as well as between public and private security,
essentially have been blurred by the changes in the international
system.21 This complex environment necessitates accepting a wider
definition of actors and organizations responsible for the protection
of the state and its interests. Such protection would entail reform of
regular armed forces, paramilitary and irregular forces, police, and
other law enforcement agencies. Effective military transformation



with the aim of facilitating Ukraine’s integration into Europe would
require as well the reform of relevant nonmilitary structures in
Ukraine, which have increased in size quite considerably from the
time of their creation in the early 1990s but basically have remained
unreformed.22 Reform of the security services would allow Ukraine
to play a more significant role in the struggle against international
terrorism as it would increase efficiency and facilitate interagency
cooperation, thus allowing Ukraine to have full-spectrum visibility
of regional and international threats. Such reform would also negate
the potential challenges that the security services could pose to
the consolidation of democracy in Ukraine. Ian Leigh argues that
the major threat posed by terrorism to democratic states is that of
over-reaction, which in turn leads to the erosions of civil liberties
and a loss of openness and transparency, all of which undercut the
legitimacy of the state.23 He argues that terrorist challenges necessitate
developing constitutional, legislative, and administrative oversight
of the security services so that they can protect society effectively
without undermining democracy.
Reform of Ukraine’s security sector is long overdue. There have
been recent allegations that the Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukraiyiny24 (SBU, the
Ukrainian security services) was complicit in the illegal export of
arms to China, Iran, and Iraq.25 The urgent need for reform of the
security sector was recognized by former National Security and
Defense Council Secretary Petro Poroshenko in August 2005.26 In an
interview, he stated that reform of the law enforcement and special
services was one of the key tasks for the new government. He went
on to point out that, in their present form, the law enforcement
agencies and special services pose a serious threat to national security.
Evidence of this was seen during the presidential elections when
allegations were made that the Interior Ministry had Yushchenko
under surveillance.27 This raised questions about the politicization
of the Interior Ministry and the degree to which Ukraine’s security
sector was impartial and apolitical. The need for reform was
recognized by the new government with the appointment in eary
2005 of Yuri Lutsenko, a popular opposition politician and a leader of
antigovernment protests in 2000, as Interior Minister.28 The Interior
Ministry, tasked with fighting endemic corruption in Ukraine and



employing 500,000 people, will now be headed for the first time by
a civilian minister. Lutsenko’s task is to end corruption among the
police and to mobilize them to serve the people. The new head of the
SBU, Igor Drizhchanyy, outlined a reform agenda for it. This included
the need for a comprehensive review of threats facing Ukraine and
responsibilities of the various security agencies in Ukraine to increase
efficiency in the fight against terrorism.29 In particular, Drizhchanyy
has called for a clear allocation of responsibilities in the fight against
corruption and organized crime, a responsibility now currently
shared by the SBU, the Interior Ministry, and the Prosecutor General’s
Office.30 The Ukrainian president also has called for a shakeup of
law enforcement agencies, and in July 2005 took the first step by
abolishing the traffic police—one of the most corrupt institutions in
Ukraine.31
Effective military transformation also requires treating all
security stakeholders within the larger context of democratization
taking place in Ukraine. Democracy cannot succeed without military
transformation and vice versa; the two are inseparably linked and
interdependent. The creation of effective military and security
structures under civilian and democratic control is an important
element of effective military transformation, an eventuality
intrinsically linked to the consolidation of democracy in Ukraine.
Theodor H. Winkler argues that, if security providers are not
accountable through the democratic process, “then democracy cannot
flourish; human rights and dignity and security are in jeopardy and
the road to good governance, socio-economic development, and the
rule of law is blocked.”32 The breadth of democratic control required
over the security stakeholders, however, is subject to debate. For
example, Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster
take a narrowly straightforward view. They argue that “democratic
control should be understood in terms of political control of the
military by the legitimate, democratically elected authorities of the
state.”33 Marybeth Ulrich offers a more detailed taxonomy of the
types of democratic political control. She divides these into four key
elements: constitutional provisions, executive oversight and control,
legislative oversight and control, and societal support.34 Ukraine
has made significant progress in all of these areas. It has developed



mechanisms for civilian control; there is a clear chain of command
from the executive to military leaders. The Ukrainian Rada, or
parliament, has oversight of the defense budget and broad policy
issues relating to defense; and within society itself there is broad
respect for the military.
Ulrich argues that democratic political control is not enough. She
maintains that what is required for effective military transformation
is democratic military professionalism, since in her view the
process of transformation as treated in the security sector reform
literature is insufficiently penetrating and comprehensive. Instead,
for Ulrich effective transformation in Ukraine would necessitate
the incorporation of key democratic norms into their structures,
organizations, mode of thinking, and cultural outlook.35 She outlines
a number of key requirements for military professionalism in a
democracy. These include a merit-based system of promotion, styles
of leadership that reflect society’s democratic norms and human
rights, high levels of military education and training, military
acceptance of its role in society, high public accountability, and
operational doctrine reflective of society’s values.36 That is, democratic
military and security professionals would accept, internalize, and
uphold democratic values, while their structures and organization
reflect those values.
For the Ukrainian military and security services to contribute
effectively to the war on terrorism, they need to do more than just
come to terms with operating in a democracy and accept civilian or
democratic political control.37 Instead, security stakeholders would
need to develop new training courses which promote democratic
professionalism, introduce a new promotion system insulated from
extrinsic pressures, and adopt new styles of leadership to reflect
democratic changes in society. Progress in these three areas would
add an important qualitative aspect to military transformation in
Ukraine. In particular, the adoption of a more democratic style of
leadership and the promotion of Ukrainian military personnel based
on merit would go some way toward encouraging and facilitating the
development of effective, well-trained, and adequately supported
commanders willing and able to assume authority in a complex
environment. Military command is the art of decisionmaking,

10

motivating, and directing forces to accomplish particular missions.
Mission command is giving commanders on the ground the scope
and authority to make timely and important decisions. It requires the
development of a style of command which promotes decentralized
command, speed of action, and initiative on the part of the individual
commander. The freedom, confidence, and flexibility required to
make timely and important decisions, particularly in peacekeeping
or stabilization operations, will be facilitated by allowing democratic
and liberal values to shape training and education, as well as
organizational command in the Ukrainian military. Although there
is no automatic link between democracy and effective military
command, the former is an important foundation for the latter.
Democratic professional forces are less political and better able to
make timely and informed decisions. In a democracy, decisions of
military operational detail are decoupled from issues of political
dogma. This does not mean that an effective military commander
is indifferent to politics. Good commanders will think about all of
the implications of their actions.38 The adoption of new styles of
leadership and command, as well as increased training and education,
also are likely to increase the prospects for recruitment and retention
of military and security personnel, since their conditions of service
would improve considerably.
What is required in Ukraine is a change in the organizational
thought process in both the security services and military, and in
how they do business. First deputy head of the Ukrainian Security
Services Vasyl Krutov has recognized the need for a change in the
SBU. He has described how the security services need to change
to reflect the democratic changes in Ukraine in the context of the
threat from international terrorism.39 He points out that new people
have come in, and that the priorities of the service have changed
to reflect the values and standards of European integration and the
democratization of Ukrainian society after the Orange Revolution.
Fundamental and far-reaching reform of Ukraine’s security sector is
essential and could have a positive spill-over effect in the war on terror. A democratically controlled security sector that is accountable
to the government will be better placed to protect Ukraine against
regional and international terrorist threats simultaneously, while
at the same time upholding and protecting Ukraine’s fragile
democracy.
11

The parameters and possibilities of military transformation in
Ukraine also will be affected by internal and external factors. The
professionalization of armed forces and democratic control in Central
and Eastern Europe are affected by both international and domestic
factors.40 The balance between these factors explains the extent of
professionalization as well as the foreign, internal, external, historical,
institutional, and cultural determinants of democratic control in
this region. This suggests that successful military transformation
in Ukraine will be contingent on democratic consolidation and the
strategic environment in which relations take place—in particular,
relations with neighbors. Military change is affected by three factors:
international, domestic, and historical.41 States have to respond to
the security threats and external environment in which they operate,
and develop military forces to meet these international pressures.
Domestically, a state’s military must respond and reflect the values
of their society. Lastly, a state’s political legacy (e.g., communist or
imperial), historical military posture (e.g., aggressive or passive), or
means of raising armies (e.g., mass levies, conscription, volunteers)
will condition the constraints and opportunities for effective reform.42
Therefore, in the next section, we shall consider the impact of both
internal and external pressures on the building of professional military
forces in Ukraine. Ukraine’s progress in military transformation, its
capabity for membership in the Euro-Atlantic community and for
providing peacekeeping troops, and its democratic consolidation
are likely to be affected by the strategic environment in which
Ukraine operates. For instance, the normalization of relations
between Russia and Ukraine would allow Ukraine to shake off its
communist legacy, both politically and militarily, and redefine its
identity as European—and then restructure its military accordingly.
Normalizing relations with its largest and most powerful neighbor
would ameliorate concerns about Russia’s inability to come to terms
with an independent Ukraine. In effect, good relations between
Russia and Ukraine would allow Kiev to concentrate on the detail
of military transformation and the building of closer cooperation
with NATO and the European Union (EU). However, Ukraine’s
membership in NATO is likely to damage relations between
these two states. Moreover, deteriorating relations with Ukraine’s
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neighbors could impact negatively on military transformation. This
would likely affect Ukraine’s ability to contribute, both generally
and specifically, to the war on terrorism.
Before proceeding in the next section to the question of building
an effective security sector, let us glance at a number of benchmarks
that will be used to evaluate progress in military transformation. For
Ukraine to achieve Euro-Atlantic integration and become a provider
of peacekeeping troops—i.e., be an effective contributor to the
war on terror—it will need to build an effective fighting force that
is controlled democratically and has incorporated key democratic
norms and values into how it trains and engages in operations.
Progress in military transformation will be affected by internal and
external factors. Ukraine’s consolidation of democracy, the building
of democratic electoral institutions, establishment of a free press, and
development of a civic society will all impact directly on military
transformation and on Ukraine’s ability to be a force for stability and
security in the region. In addition, economic growth and progress
in the development of a market economy also will impact directly
on the government’s plans to reform, restructure, and modernize
the military, as well as affect democratic consolidation. Externally,
relations between Ukraine and Russia, as well as U.S. engagement,
will shape the possibilities of Ukraine’s involvement in the war on
terror.
PROGRESS SO FAR IN BUILDING
AN EFFECTIVE SECURITY SECTOR
This section explores what progress Ukraine has made in
transforming its military and security sector, and evaluates how
this impacts on its ability to contribute to the defeat of international
terrorism. Ukraine’s progress in security sector reform will be
examined in light of the benchmarks of effective military transformation outlined above. Informed by interviews conducted in Kiev in
April 2005 and drawing on key policy documents, we shall consider
the extent to which Ukraine is developing professional, well-equipped,
and fully funded military and security forces that are controlled
democratically and marked by robust democratic professionalism.
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Ukraine has made significant progress in consolidating its democracy, a key enabler for military transformation, and has the potential
to be an effective military contributor to the war on terrorism.
Military Professionalism—Building a Fighting Force.
Ukraine has made progress in developing its military
professionalism. It has a clear plan for modernizing, restructuring,
and enhancing interoperability. The Strategic Defense Bulletin, a key
government document on defense reform, outlines how Ukraine
will pursue its national strategic interests and creates a vision of the
future organization and configuration of Ukraine’s armed forces.43 It
deals primarily with the development of Ukraine’s manpower and
hardware assets—the key ingredients for building a professional
military able to undertake military activities in an effective and
efficient way. Between 2001 and 2005, Ukraine had reduced the
number of its service personnel from 416,000 to 245,000, divided into
40 percent combat units and 60 percent service support. During this
same period, the armed forces discarded over 6,300 pieces of obsolete
and inoperable equipment and disposed of 97,800 tons of degraded
or useless missiles and ammunition (more on this topic below). At
the end of 2005, Ukraine had over 3,000 tanks, 4,290 armored combat
vehicles, 3,437 artillery systems, 575 combat aircraft, 182 combat
helicopters, and 15 combat ships.44 To develop Ukraine’s fighting
force, the government will introduce a new structure for the military,
including better command, control, and logistics. It also has plans for
additional significant cuts in personnel and reductions in stockpiles
of arms and the upgrading and modernization of hardware—all
encompassed in an increasing defense budget.
The key goals of defense reform are to achieve full interoperability
with NATO forces and command structures and to establish the
means to respond quickly to requests by the UN or other international
organizations for peacekeeping troops. In a detailed study of U.S.Ukraine military cooperation programs, Leonid Polyakov45 has
argued that full combat interoperability with U.S. forces is not a
realistic possibility for the Ukrainian military in the short term.46 But
he does acknowledge that the extensive program of U.S.-Ukrainian
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military cooperation has created at least the necessary foundations
for interoperability between these two states at the tactical level in
low-intensity operations such as peacekeeping. In other words, the 13
years of military cooperation between the United States and Ukraine
have enhanced interoperability between these two states to the
extent that they can now conduct successful combined peacekeeping
operations.47
For the Ukrainian government and military, developing even
limited—let alone full—interoperability with U.S. and all other
NATO forces will have an implicit positive spillover effect. It will
increase the democratic professionalism of the Ukrainian forces,
and will allow Ukraine to deploy democratically controlled forces
regionally or internally to support the fight against terrorism. To
enhance interoperability and develop its peacekeeping potential,
as we noted earlier, the Ukrainian government plans to reduce and
restructure its personnel, increase sustainability, and modernize
its equipment. The new restructured military also will be reduced
significantly in size. The total strength of the military by 2011 could be
in the vicinity of 100,000 personnel.48 In an attempt to professionalize
its military, Ukraine also plans to move towards a full standing
army by 2010, a year before the final stage of reform in Ukraine as
outlined in the State Program of Development of the Armed Forces
of Ukraine, 2006-2011. In the transition period, Ukraine will continue
with a mixed system of staffing, assuring that all positions critical to
ensuring operational effectiveness are occupied by contracted service
personnel.49 To facilitate this transition, Ukraine has selected three
brigades, one from each service, to be manned fully by volunteers
by the end of 2006. The economic and social costs of moving towards
a professional, standing, well-equipped, and adequately trained
fighting force will be sizeable.
Sustainable progress in military transformation in Ukraine’s army
is dependent on its successful transition to a market economy. A
modern and efficient market economy also is an important enabling
condition for democratic consolidation.50 This suggests that, for
Ukraine to make a military contribution to the war on terrorism
and build a stable democratic state as the bulwark against regional
terrorism, then economic growth and the rapid development of a
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flourishing market economy are vital. Anders Aslund has pointed
out that the government’s economic policy, under former Prime
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, was disastrous, with growth plummeting owing to a fall in investment. Aslund argues that the interference
of the Prime Minister in pricing and property disputes, compounded
by the disruptive effects of widespread nationalization and renewed
sales of privatized companies, all acted to undermine property rights
and investment in Ukraine.51 An assessment by the Razumkov Centre
of the new government’s economic policy also suggests that progress
thus far has been slow and patchy.52 Yushchenko’s government
has managed to raise social benefits, pensions, and wages, but its
administrative methods have affected business, the investment
climate, and economic growth adversely.53 Poor economic progress
in Ukraine will constrain the ability of the government to engage
in military transformation, which is a costly process. It involves
such infrastructural costs as those for the resettlement and housing
of military personnel, as well as such operational costs as those
incident to buying new equipment, training, and educating security
providers.
In recognition of the explicit link between Ukraine’s economy
and military transformation, the new government has developed
a plan which will concentrate financial resources on key priority
areas to enable Ukraine to develop modern and combat-capable
armed forces within tight budgetary constraints.54 During 2005, the
imposition of strict fiscal controls on the military and the elimination
of inappropriate expenditures has allowed for a more effective use
of budget resources.55 In addition, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) has
clear plans to radically change the structure of the defense budget,
reduce high personnel costs while shifting the emphasis to spending
on force training, weapons, and equipment. The White Book, the official evaluation of progress in defense reform in Ukraine in 2005,
points out that “the defense budgets for 2000-2004 were not wellbalanced and left no headroom for development or investment as most
of the money was spent on meeting the fixed costs of personnel.”56
During 2005, Ukraine spent 81.5 percent of its defense budget on
personnel costs, as compared with Germany, which spent 50.7
percent, and Poland at 28 percent. In 2006, Ukraine plans to reduce
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its fixed personnel costs to 66.5 percent, which are slated to fall to
57.6 percent by 2011. In February 2006, in a clear sign of democratic
support for the defense priorities set by the new government, the
Ukrainian parliament approved a significant increase in the defense
budget for 2006 amounting to a gross domestic product (GDP) rise
from 1.36 to 1.74 percent.57 The Ukrainian Defense Ministry’s finance
director Ivan Marko stated that the new budget would allow the
government to move from merely sustaining the military to actually
developing the military.58 This budgetary increase, combined with
efficiency drives, restructuring, and reduction of forces, will allow
Ukraine to continue to develop professional, well-equipped, and
trained military personnel. Full realization, however, is contingent
on continued economic growth in Ukraine.
In reorganizing and restructuring its military forces, Ukraine
plans to create three functional divisions within the armed forces: the
Joint Rapid Reaction forces (JRRF), the Main Defense Force, and the
Strategic Reserves. The JRRF, which is responsible for peacekeeping
operations, will be the most powerful part of the fighting forces, with
an operational readiness capability in 30 days. By 2011, the JRRF
will be staffed by 29,000 personnel, or 30 percent of the total combat
strength of the military.59 The JRRF will have two components: the
Immediate Reaction Forces and Rapid Reaction Forces. These forces
will be equipped with medium and light equipment and trained for
peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and emergency relief operations.
Ukraine has made significant progress in training of its JRRF.
Prioritizing the development and training of the rapid reaction forces
in Ukraine will allow it to continue to be an active participant in
peacekeeping operations. In a recent interview, the Defense Minister
stated that during 2005 priority was given to training the Joint Rapid
Response Forces rather than other forces.60 Clearly drawing attention
to this priority in defense reform, the White Book states that special
“attention will be focused on accelerated development of the JRRF.”
This prioritization also is reflected in the share of defense spending
allocated to the JRRF during the second stage of defense reform
during 2006-11. The JRRF will receive almost a third more funding
than the Main Defense Force, even though the former is half the
size of the latter.61 The Defense Academy in Kiev has trained 1,000
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peacekeeping troops since its inception. Ukrainian peacekeepers
currently are trained to work in the diverse range of roles required by
the international community—from traditional peacekeeping roles to
observation missions. Ukraine’s active involvement in peacekeeping
operations has a positive side effect in terms of developing skills
among service personnel. Writing in 1999, before he became the
current Defense Minister, Hrytsenko acknowledged the importance
of Ukraine’s involvement in peacekeeping operations in terms of
developing key military skills and experience.62 A recent survey of
Ukrainians participating in peacekeeping operations in the former
Yugoslavia revealed that almost half of those surveyed identified the
desire to improve their level of professionalism as a key motivator in
volunteering for peacekeeping.63
The Main Defense Force will operate at a lower state of readiness,
its main tasks being to provide national defense, reinforce the
JRRF, and serve as a rotational pool for units deployed abroad on
peacekeeping missions. Placing too much emphasis on this particular
element of defense reform, in terms of funding, training, and
equipment, would leave the remainder of Ukraine’s forces weak and
could damage morale in the short term. The emphasis placed on the
acquisition of the English language, in the absence of comprehensive
facilities for all military personnel to acquire this skill, could, in
effect, reinforce this two-tier system of elite and non-elite military
forces. Unless personnel in the Main Defense Force are offered the
same opportunities and training as those in the JRRF, Ukraine might
struggle to recruit, let alone retain, a standing professional force of
100,000 personnel by 2011.
There also is a clear recognition by the new government in
Ukraine of the need to invest in new equipment if it is to develop a
professional military. The White Book states that professionalism of
the Ukrainian armed forces will necessitate “ensuring the provision
of state of the art weapons and equipment.” In emphasizing the
importance of the JRRF, the government asserts that these forces are
considered to be the top priority for equipping with modern and
upgraded weapons and equipment. This will include modern digital
communications equipment and a new AN-70 transport aircraft in
2006. The last section of the Strategic Defense Bulletin highlights the
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challenges facing Ukraine in equipping its JRRF for deployment,
noting that “the Ukrainian Armed Forces are equipped with almost
all types of [outdated] armament and equipment. The most obsolete
equipment can be found in Ukraine’s Naval Forces combat ships, its
missile and artillery system, and guided antiaircraft missiles. First
Deputy Minister for Defense Leonid Polyakov has drawn attention
to one of the difficult consequences of modernizing Ukraine’s
equipment: the disposal of surplus small and light arms.
A report by the Razumkov Centre in 2005 points out that the
depots and arsenals belonging to the Ukrainian MoD contain huge
stocks of conventional ammunition that is not only obsolete and unfit
for combat use, but also exceeds the needs of the military by up to 75
percent.64 The continued storage of this ammunition inherited after
the breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) is a
costly process detracting from the funding of the Ukrainian military.
More significantly, the accidental explosions at the ammunition
depots in Artemisvsk in October 2003 and near Melitopol in May 2004
clearly demonstrate that these depots pose a threat to the security of
the Ukrainian people. In addition, the existence of large stockpiles of
ammunition and small and light arms in Ukraine “offers a deferred
supply for terrorist activity or for equipping organized criminals,
extremist groups, irregular armed forces, or feeding the criminal
‘black market.’”65 The disappearance of 100 decommissioned S75 missiles from a facility near Zhytomyr in 2004 provided a stark
indication that the Defense Ministry had failed to establish a clear
system of weaponry accountability and control in Ukraine, making
it a potential arms sales provider to terrorist groups.66
By the end of 2005, however, Ukraine had made significant
progress in reducing its stockpiles of excess ammunition and small
arms, and can now claim to have data “on every single weapon
and equipment piece” owned by the Ukrainian military.67 The new
government also has made some limited progress in modernizing,
repairing, and upgrading equipment. During 2005, seven Bulat T64 tanks were modernized; 19 Barsuk reconnaissance stations were
upgraded; and over 550 units of automotive, engineering, navigation,
and computer equipment were repaired.68

19

Democratic Control of Ukrainian Forces.
With the signing of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, the new
government in Ukraine also has acknowledged the importance of
ensuring democratic control of the armed forces and security services.
This plan outlines the need for institution-building in Ukraine as well
as for the processes by which these institutions exercise democratic
control over society in general, and the military specifically, as well
as a need for increased transparency and accountability. The first
NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, approved in Prague in November 2002,
was a result of Ukraine’s decision to move towards full membership
in the Alliance. The new Ukrainian government agreed to a NATOUkraine Annual Target Plan for 2005 which detailed the activities
required of Ukraine to achieve the objectives laid out in the NATOUkraine Action Plan, which takes a comprehensive approach
to security sector reform in Ukraine by linking it explicitly with
democratic objectives. John Colston, the Assistant Secretary General
for Defense policy and Planning at NATO, stated that “defense
and security sector reform has been on the NATO-Ukraine agenda
for a long time—the Allies are determined to assist Ukraine in
strengthening the democratic credentials of its security sector.”69
Ukraine has made some notable progress in increasing transparency and openness in its defense reform. The publication of the
White Book in early 2006, which was the first in an annual series
of open reports by the MoD on the armed forces in Ukraine, is an
important first step. This document provides an open and honest
appraisal of the challenges facing the Ukrainian military, as well as
a clear statement of priorities over the next 5 years. In an attempt
to speed up democratic civilian control of the military, Ukraine has
been appointing predominantly civilian employees to the main
managerial offices of the MoD.70 More importantly, while four out of
the five Deputy Ministers of Defense in Ukraine were former military
officers, all are now civilians. The appointment of civilian personnel
to the Defense Ministry has created the enabling conditions for the
building of close and supportive relations between the MoD and the
Ukrainian parliament’s Defense Committee. This has had a positive
side effect in terms of democratic political control of the military and
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has allowed the MoD to make its case for a budgetary increase in
2006 to cover the costs of reform.
There also is recognition within the Ukrainian parliament of
the need to extend democratic control and oversight to the security
services. Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Ukrainian
parliament Georgiy Kryuchkov emphasized the need for the new
parliament elected in March 2006 to create laws, as well as a new
committee, to ensure democratic oversight of the security sector.71
Until the new government is fully formed in Ukraine, progress in
this area will be on hold and is likely to be slow since the security
services have yet to come to terms with operating in a democracy.
Traditionally, the Ukrainian parliament played a very limited role
in defense reform. Its main areas of responsibility are approving the
defense budget, adopting laws on defense and security, implementing
those laws, determining the broad principles of foreign policy, and
warmaking. These powers are more extensive even than those of the
UK’s House of Commons and are on a par with those of the U.S.
Congress. The role of the Ukrainian parliament has been constrained
by a lack of access to information and presidential resistance to
parliamentary oversight of defense issues. While it has the formal
powers to approve the budget, it lacked the capacity to scrutinize
detailed legislation. The relevant committees in parliament have
had few professional military or defense advisers. It is clear that this
situation now has changed quite fundamentally, as the Ukrainian
Defense Committee today plays an increasingly important role in
shaping military transformation in Ukraine.
Democratic Professionalism in Ukraine’s Forces.
Hardest to evaluate is how much progress Ukraine has made
in developing democratic professionalism among its military and
security personnel. Democratic professionalism is the acceptance
and internalization of key norms and values through changes in
education, training, promotion, career advancement, recruitment,
and retention. The Ukrainian military, compared with the security
services, has made the most significant progress. Ukraine has
increased the level of training across all branches of the armed forces.
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In addition to increasing the number of tactical military training
exercises, the Ukrainian military also plans to delegate responsibility
for the delivery and evaluation of training to individual commanders.
This would suggest the adoption of a merit-based approach to
promotion—at least at command level. It also hints at the adoption
by the Ukrainian military of a more positive approach to “mission
command,” i.e., decentralization of authority to commanders in
the tactical/operational realms. The White Book foreshadows these
changes in stating that the “promotion of command personnel
will directly depend on the training levels of their subordinate
elements.”72
Movement toward the development of a centralized system of
personnel management in 2005, aiming eventually to comply with
NATO standards, further suggests that the Ukrainian military is
setting up the institutional framework necessary for a move to a
merit-based approach to promotion.73 Moreover, it signifies recognition of the need to manage the career development of individual
service personnel, which is likely to enhance recruitment and
retention and build morale. The dramatic reduction in military
personnel also has necessitated the streamlining and reevaluation
of the role and function of military education in Ukraine. The MoD
has signified its readiness to increase the level of military education
of all military officers so that they can perform their role adequately
as leaders. The White Book states that “for brigade commanders,
the standards of education will be raised to the operational and
strategic level, and for battalion commander they will be raised to
the operational and tactical level.74 Indicating that Ukraine is keen to
embrace a merit-based approach to promotion, it also has adopted
a new system of officer training to provide officers with the skills
and knowledge they need prior to promotion to higher ranks. In a
further sign of qualitative improvements in military education, the
Ministry also has accepted the concept of sponsoring university
students before they join the military. Currently, Ukraine has over
1,000 university students who, on completion of their degrees, will
complete a year of military training and become military officers,
somewhat on the model of the U.S. ROTC programs.
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THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY
AND MILITARY TRANSFORMATION
As was discussed earlier, the U.S. National Security Strategy
draws an explicit link between democratization and defeating
terrorism. The consolidation of democracy in Ukraine is, therefore,
a means to achieve greater stability. Democratization also is a force
enabler in facilitating military transformation in this state. If Ukraine
continues along the democratic path, it will be a force for stability in
the region and at the same time also will be better placed to contribute
militarily and diplomatically to the war on terrorism.
Ukraine has made some notable progress in the consolidation
and building of its democratic and electoral institutions since the
Orange Revolution, thus boding well for military transformation. In
December 2004, in an attempt to break the political impasse between
the two contending presidential camps growing out of the Orange
Revolution, the parliament adopted far-reaching constitutional
changes in which Ukraine would become a parliamentary-presidential system. After the elections and the formation of a new
government in Ukraine in March 2005, the Cabinet, rather than the
President, became the supreme executive decisionmaking body.
The President retains the right to appoint the Defense Minister,
the Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister. The move in Ukraine
towards a parliamentary system, where members are elected on a
purely proportional basis from the national party lists, theoretically
encourages democratic institution-building and increases
parliamentary oversight of military transformation. The introduction
of a parliamentary system with a Prime Minister accountable to
parliament heading a Cabinet will ensure a better balance of power
between the executive and legislative branches in all areas of
government. It also will encourage cross-party cooperation and has
the potential to increase transparency in decisionmaking—including
defense and security policy.75 However, despite the need to widen
access to decisions in the defense sphere, there is no guarantee that
a new parliament necessarily will facilitate military transformation
in Ukraine. The current parliament has acted as a spoiler in terms
of defense reform, and consistently has thwarted attempts by the
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Defense Minister to implement desirable aspects of reform. For
instance, the parliament has turned down a number of bills needed
for cooperation with NATO, including the use of Ukraine’s transport
aviation in NATO airlift operations and the admittance of foreign
militaries onto Ukrainian territory for multinational exercises.76
Ukraine has a flourishing civic society and increasingly a
free press—two of the key components for successful military
transformation as laid out in the NATO Action Plan. A free press
encourages governmental accountability in the security sphere, and
provides people information about defense and security issues. A
developed civic culture ensures that all security stakeholders in
society have access to the decisionmaking process and can influence
policy. The Orange Revolution created the enabling conditions and
motivation for the uniting of the many opposition groups in Ukraine—
nongovernment organizations (NGOs), youth, church groups, and
all sectors of society—to overthrow the old regime. Ukraine had
benefited from more than a decade of civil society engagement and
support from NATO, the EU, the United States, and NGOs, the rise
of a significant middle class, and a new and critical news media
on the Internet.77 Public response to the massive election fraud on
November 21, 2004, as embodied in the Orange Revolution, resulted
in the highest level of civil engagement in the political process in
Ukraine since independence in 1991.78 A further sign of the mature
civic culture in Ukraine was the peaceful nature of the protests and
the compromises that were struck by the opposition to ensure the
peaceful transfer of power. A key element for successful military
transformation is a free and open press, an area in which Ukraine has
made considerable progress. The news media began to operate more
freely in Ukraine after the revolution. With the previous regime,
intimidation, pro-government ownership, favoritism in granting
broadcasting rights, and government guidance on what to publish
and how to publish were the order of the day. Some concerns have
been expressed, however, about the actual level of governmental
support for a free press when a reporter was heavily criticized for
revealing damaging information about the finances and lifestyle of
Yushchenko’s son.79
Although Ukraine has made considerable progress in the
consolidation of its democracy, a key barrier to democratization,
24

and hence military transformation, is the high level of corruption.
Alexander Motyl recently has described Ukraine as an “excessively
corrupt country.”80 Corruption, in the sense of the misuse of public
power for private gain or the misuse of entrusted power, is a major
cultural and structural impediment to military transformation in
Ukraine. The absence of the rule of law, inefficient bureaucracies,
over-regulation of the economy, alternative systems for organizing
society, and the lack of accountability and transparency in government
have formed a breeding ground for corruption. One of the most
damaging effects of corruption is its undermining of the consolidation
of democracy.81 Distrust in elected officials breeds cynicism, apathy,
and eventually alienation from the democratic process.82 The collapse
of the ruling coalition in Ukraine in September 2005 amid allegations
and counterallegations of corruption has delayed much needed
economic, social, and political reforms. Even more importantly, the
poor showing of Yushchenko’s party in the parliamentary elections
indicates that his reputation has been damaged significantly.
EXTERNAL PRESSURES ON
MILITARY TRANSFORMATION
Ukraine’s geo-strategic environment also has affected the pace and
shape of its military transformation and consolidation of democracy.
In particular, the parameters and possibilities of change will be
affected by the degree to which Ukraine maintains good relations
with its neighbors—not least of which is the Russian Federation—
and by its level of engagement with the United States and Europe, in
the process of transformation more generally.
In a pragmatic recognition of the importance of maintaining
good relations with its larger neighbor, President Yushchenko’s first
formal state visit after his inauguration was to Russia in early 2005.
During that year, relations between these two states went through
a long overdue, at times painful, process of reevaluation, including
particularly the nature of the relationship. Some limited progress in
changing the nature of relations was evident during 2005 when the
two states agreed to begin demarcating a land border between the
two; they also finalized an agreement on simplifying border-crossing
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regimes for their citizens. Signifying a recognition of the mutual
benefits of continued pragmatic relations, economic ties between
these two countries during 2005 also continued to develop.83
The attempt to build pragmatic relations between these two
states has been hampered by Russia’s interference in the Ukrainian
presidential elections and Russia’s decision to force Ukraine to pay
world prices for Russian gas. Russian interference in the democratic
process in Ukraine before and during the presidential elections in
2004 was both covert and overt. In an attempt to secure the victory of
the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych, the Russian government sent
what are referred to in Russia as “political technologists” to advise
and shape the candidate’s presidential election campaign. President
Putin all but publicly endorsed Yanukovych with his strategically
timed visits to Kiev just prior to the first and second round of
voting in the Ukrainian presidential elections. Interfering overtly
in the Ukrainian elections, President Putin telephoned Yanukovych
to congratulate him on his victory when the controversy over his
supposed victory had caused mass protests in the streets in Ukraine.
President Putin’s attempt to influence the outcome of the Ukrainian
presidential elections damaged relations in the short term between
these two states. Independent Duma Deputy Vladimir Ryzhkov
stated that the president’s meddling in the Ukrainian election had
harmed Russia’s long-term interests in Ukraine by alienating millions
of Ukrainians.84
In a sign of strains in the relationship, in early 2006 the Russian
natural gas company, Gazprom, announced that it had cut off
supplies of gas to Ukraine. This unilateral action was in response to
Ukraine’s rejection of a proposed gas price increase. Under pressure
from Europe, Russia and Ukraine worked out a compromise deal
whereby Ukraine pays more for gas, but the higher price is offset by
supplementing Russian supplies with cheaper Central Asian gas.85
The deal has been criticized heavily in the Ukrainian parliament and
press, not least because the intermediary through which Ukraine will
buy this cheaper gas, RosUkrEnergo, was investigated for criminal
activity in 2005.86 Although Russia has been condemned for what
was termed economic pressure and blackmail by the Ukrainian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the new agreement has facilitated the
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normalization of relations with its neighbor.87 By paying what are in
essence world prices for gas, Ukraine will no longer be a petitioner for
Russian good will and instead can build relations with its neighbor as
an equal partner. Since Ukraine’s accession of independence in 1991,
Russia had subsidized the Ukrainian economy with cheap gas, in
effect allowing Ukraine to postpone hard economic decisions about
restructuring its own industries.88 The compromise deal worked out
with Russia now halts the resulting waste of energy and encourages
Ukrainian enterprises to introduce energy-saving technologies. Most
important of all, it will facilitate Ukraine’s ultimate acquisition of
economic and political independence from Moscow. 89
Russia and Ukraine do have a number of unresolved and
contentious legacy issues that are likely to hamper the prospects for
normalization of relations in the short to medium term. The first of
these is the disagreement over the speed and shape of the Single
Economic Space (SES). During the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) summit in Yalta in September 2003, a treaty creating the
SES between Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine was signed. It
was ratified by the Russian and Ukrainian parliaments in April 2004.
The SES would entail the establishment of a Free Trade Area followed
by a customs union and eventually the formation of an economic
union among the member states. However, there is some concern in
Kiev that the SES will jeopardize Ukraine’s efforts to join the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and the EU, that Ukraine could lose its
economic sovereignty, and that Russia, as the state among the four
with the largest GDP, will dominate key decisions in any SES.90 The
new government in Ukraine has been keen to advance a new modified
model of the SES—one that aims to preserve amicable relations
with its neighbor but does not preclude Ukrainian membership in
the WTO and the EU.91 Ukrainian Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk
explained Kiev’s approach to the SES with his assurance that Ukraine
would not withdraw but merely would seek a free trade zone with
its four neighbors.92 However, this watered-down model of the SES
is unlikely to satisfy the other three states, all of which are resolved
to move towards full economic integration.
A second key issue that will affect the possibility of normalizing
relations with Russia is Ukraine’s success in resolving the status of
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the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) based in Sevastopol in bilateral
negotiations with Russia. There was a clear sign just months into
the new government’s tenure that Kiev was prepared to advance
Ukraine’s legitimate interests in the region by arranging the
eventual removal of the Russian naval base located on its territory.
Specifically, in April 2005, President Yushchenko announced that the
status of the Russian BSF in Sevastopol needed to be reconsidered.93
A few days earlier, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk had
stated that the 1997 agreement according to which Russia could
use the base of Sevastopol until 2017 would not be extended.94 This
statement was made in response to a number of highly publicized
incidents in the Crimea which have threatened Ukraine’s territorial
integrity and Ukrainian law. At the end of March 2005, for example,
a Russian landing craft carried out an unauthorized practice landing
near Feodosia in Ukraine. A few weeks later in mid-April, a group
of Ukrainian observers were denied access to the Russian base in
Sevastopol to check on allegations that the Russians were subletting
Black Sea Fleet facilities. Ukraine’s response to these incidents
suggests that the new government is prepared to assert its full
sovereignty in the region, which is likely to damage relations with
the Russian Federation.
Normalization of relations between these two states is affected
not only by the legacy issues outlined above, but also by Ukraine’s
relationship with Europe and the West. Since his inauguration,
President Yushchenko has declared that Ukraine’s main foreign
objective will be securing EU and NATO membership. Ukraine’s
strategic reorientation towards Europe will affect the prospects
for military transformation in two ways. It will shape Ukraine’s
perception of threats in the external environment, and also will
affect Ukraine’s democratic transformation, which in turn will
have a bearing on military transformation. In a recent lecture,
Francis Fukuyama draws attention to the importance of what he
terms national “neighborhoods” in determining the prospects for
democratization.95 Fukuyama argues that, as societies fall under
the influence of what goes on around them in a globalized world,
it is inevitable that people begin to copy the norms and political
movements of other societies and polities. This suggests that EU and
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NATO engagement with Ukraine serves two vital purposes. First,
it enhances Ukraine’s long-term security; and second, it promotes
and encourages democracy through proximity and the consequent
spread and institutionalization of democratic norms and values.
Relations between Ukraine and the United States have improved
significantly since the election of President Yushchenko. In a
successful visit to the United States, Yushchenko succeeded in
normalizing Ukrainian relations with its most important ally after
many years in the wilderness. During this visit, Yushchenko secured
a pledge of support for lifting the Jackson-Vanik Amendment that
restricts U.S. trade with Ukraine, a U.S. commitment to support
Ukraine’s entry into the WTO, endorsement of Ukraine’s NATO
membership aspirations, easing of the visa restrictions, and an aid
package to facilitate Ukraine’s domestic transformation. Moreover,
the decision by the new government of Ukraine to withdraw its
forces from Iraq apparently has not damaged U.S.-Ukraine relations.
However, those relations could be damaged if Yushchenko is unable
to implement the far-reaching reforms in the economic and political
spheres that are required to transform Ukraine into a stable and secure
democracy. Progress in reform is dependent on good relations with
the United States, Europe, and Russia. However, good relations with
the United States and Europe also ultimately depend on Ukraine’s
democratization and military transformation.
CASE STUDY OF UKRAINIAN
PEACEKEEPERS IN IRAQ
Through a case study, this section critically evaluates the
performance of the Ukrainian peacekeepers in Iraq during a
particularly difficult operation, the defense of the Coalition
Provisional Authority compound in Wasit province. Such a study
of the effectiveness and capability of Ukrainian peacekeepers has
been chosen because peacekeeping is a key niche capability that the
Ukrainians are keen to develop and to which they have assigned
a high priority. An evaluation of the Ukrainian peacekeepers’
performance will allow for a determination of just how much progress
Ukraine really has made on the ground in developing a democratic
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professional force able to be deployed in behalf of the international
community to promote peace and stability in conflict zones. In
addition, the Ukrainian peacekeepers in Iraq are of interest because
they provide an important test case of the ability of the Ukrainian
units to be reliable coalition performers as stabilization peacekeepers
in contrast to more traditional peacekeepers who focus narrowly
on preventing violence between opposing camps. As discussed
earlier, these stabilization operations are more complex tasks in an
uncertain and rapidly changing environment in which the parties
have not reached a formal agreement on peace. Finally, this case
study has been chosen to highlight the paradoxical effects of military
transformation in Ukraine from an American perspective. On the
one hand, effective reform allows Ukraine to develop the capability
to be an effective contributor to the war on terrorism. On the other,
however, this case study suggests that democratic consolidation
is likely to weaken the commitment of the Ukrainian government
to become involved in stabilization or strategic peacekeeping. The
new government in Ukraine is unlikely, in the future, to have the
domestic support it needs to send peacekeepers on complex national
stabilization operations. Instead, a restructured, reformed, more
efficient and effective Ukrainian JRRF might find itself deployed only
in traditional peacekeeping operations designed to keep warring
parties apart.
Ukraine clearly has demonstrated its commitment to peacekeeping through its active involvement in various operations since 1992.
Recently Ukraine has cooperated with NATO in maintaining security
and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. In the Balkans, Ukraine has
contributed an infantry battalion, a mechanized infantry battalion,
and a helicopter squadron to the NATO-led peacekeeping force
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It has deployed peacekeeping forces
in Kosovo, and 300 Ukrainian peacekeepers still serve there as
part of the joint Polish-Ukrainian battalion. The final contingent of
Ukrainian peacekeepers in the Wasit province of Iraq performed a
number of significant duties. The 7th Detached Mechanized Brigade
detained suspected or known terrorists, confiscated weapons and
ammunition, and, with the cooperation of the Kazakhstan field
engineering detachment, defused and destroyed ammunition and
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unexploded ordnance.96 In addition, the brigade completed civil
support projects such as repairing and refurbishing schools and
hospitals, restored water supply lines and sewer systems, and
supplied the local population with potable drinking water.
Events in Kut in Iraq in April 2004 suggest that more robust
strategic peacekeeping by the Ukrainian forces lacks sufficient
domestic political support. Followers of rebel Shia leader Moqtada
al-Sadr launched a well-coordinated uprising across southern
Iraq. It included attacks on the Coalition Provisional Authority’s
(CPA) headquarters in the city of Kut in Wasit province where the
Ukrainian peacekeepers were based. Allegations have been made
that the Ukrainian forces failed to defend the compound when it
was attacked and pulled out of Kut, thus abandoning the Iraqi city
to Shia insurgents.97 The most damning criticisms of the Ukrainian
peacekeepers’ resolve have come from CPA governance coordinator
Mark Etherington, a former member of the British parachute regiment. Etherington claims that the Ukrainian forces in Kut abandoned
the city without a word of warning to CPA headquarters, and the
province then simply collapsed.98 In explaining this unauthorized
withdrawal of Ukrainian forces, brigade commander Sergey
Ostrovskiy told Etherington that, because of disturbances in other
cities, Sadr followers informed him that the safety of Ukrainian forces
in Kut could not be guaranteed and that they had thus withdrawn
to avoid bloodshed, leaving CPA to wonder who was supposed to
be guaranteeing safety to whom.99 Etherington is even more critical
of the performance of Ukrainian soldiers inside the compound
during the attack by Sadr’s forces, stating that he detected “limited
enthusiasm for the fight among our Ukrainian soldiers. Some were in
firing positions, but many were not; and a few had quietly absented
themselves.”100 Etherington further questions the commitment of the
Ukrainian peacekeepers. He points out that, despite being told by
coalition superiors that U.S. General Ricardo Sanchez had ordered
the Ukrainians to stay and defend the compound, the Ukrainians
disobeyed orders and evacuated to Camp Delta two and a half miles
away, leaving the compound and its personnel undefended.101
These criticisms of Ukrainian peacekeepers raise two important
interrelated questions. First is whether or not events in Kut indicate
that Ukrainian peacekeepers in general are willing to stand and
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fight if the mission so requires in strategic peacekeeping. Second
is whether or not these alleged failings in Kut indicate a lack of
commitment by the political masters of the Ukrainian troops to more
robust peacekeeping. David Stokes suggests that the explanation
might indeed be the lack of political commitment from above.
Stokes, a coalition security contractor and site supervisor of the
CPA compound in Kut, avers that the Ukrainian soldiers stationed
at the CPA compound fought valiantly and tirelessly during the
attack.102 In his unclassified report on the attack against the CPA
compound, Stokes goes on to draw attention to the limited military
capability of the Ukrainian peacekeepers. He points out that they
“were never prepared to fight a ground offensive. Towards the end
of night on the 6th of April, the Ukrainians began to run low on
ammunition. Additionally, they had no night vision equipment nor
did they have any heavy weapons which could be set up in defensive
positions.”103
Admitting a degree of mismatch between what the Ukrainian
peacekeepers were trained for and what was expected by CPA in this
more complex and hostile environment, Etherington draws attention
to the key difficulties of the Ukrainian peacekeepers. He asserts that
what was needed in Wasit province was a more aggressive program
of foot patrols in the streets and alleys, but that this was beyond the
capabilities and experience of the Ukrainians.104 Ukrainian Defense
Minister Yevhen Marchuk had made clear that the Ukrainians in Iraq
were expected to be involved in traditional peacekeeping, not strategic
peacekeeping. More explicitly, he stated that “our peacekeepers
were not to engage in hostilities in Kut because this was not their
mission.”105 He went on to explain that the mission for his forces
was not to guard or defend the city of Kut, but rather to guard local
Iraqi officials who had fled government offices at the start of the
uprising. Major General Leonid Holopatiuk, head of the Ukrainian
military’s Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Department, felt that the
Ukrainian mission became dramatically more challenging during
April and that “the majority of our contingent in Iraq was ready for a
more classic peacekeeping mission,” even if not for the heavy attack
actually received106 Thus legitimate questions do remain as to the
capability and commitment of Ukrainian soldiers on the ground and
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politicians back in Kiev to move from light peacekeeping tasks to
strategic peacekeeping in a complex and potentially hostile theater
of operations.
This case study also raises questions about the degree to which
Ukrainian forces generally, and the peacekeepers in particular, accept
and reflect the democratic and liberal values of Ukrainian society—
that is, the level of democratic professionalism. On their return from
Iraq, security forces detained the Ukrainian peacekeepers at the
Boryspil airport in Kiev. The Ukrainian Defense Ministry confirmed
that over $300,000 were confiscated from the troops.107 The Ukrainian
news media reported allegations that money intended for operations
in Iraq had been diverted illegally and smuggled back into Ukraine
by the Ukrainian peacekeepers.108 In June 2005, former commander
of Ukraine’s troops in Iraq Major General Serhiy Savchenko was
arrested on money smuggling charges.109
The question of Ukrainian peacekeepers’ commitment, capability,
and democratic professionalism ultimately cannot be separated from
the issue of increased democratic political control in Ukraine in light
of its consolidation of democracy. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was
unpopular in Ukraine, with little support in parliament or among
the Ukrainian people for the deployment of Ukrainian peacekeepers.
The death of eight Ukrainian soldiers in Iraq in an explosion at an
ammunition dump led to calls by the Ukrainian parliament for
immediate withdrawal of forces.110 In January 2005, the Ukrainian
parliament again called on the President to withdraw the Ukrainian
peacekeepers.111 During his presidential campaign, Yushchenko
felt the need to declare that he would withdraw Ukrainian forces
from Iraq.112 There was increasing domestic concern that Ukraine
itself would become a future target for terrorist attacks.113 In light
of terrorist attacks in London in July 2005, Yushchenko was under
increased domestic pressure to speed up the withdrawal of Ukrainian
forces. The Communist Party issued a statement demanding that the
president go ahead and act in line with the parliament’s decision to
withdraw the Ukrainian military contingent from Iraq.114 It would
thus seem that increased democratic political control in Ukraine
could limit Ukraine’s willingness to deploy its military in support of
the war on terrorism. More democratic and inclusive political control
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over peacekeeping activities is therefore very likely to limit the range
of activities and the types of operations Ukraine will commit to in
the future.
SUMMARY
• The author has argued that Ukraine can contribute to the
U.S.-led war on terrorism in two key ways: through the
consolidation of democracy, which allows Ukraine to be a
force for stability and peace in the region, and through the
development of peacekeeping forces.
• In Ukraine, the goals of military transformation are EuroAtlantic integration and the development of deployable
peacekeeping forces, both of which will promote democracy
and allow Ukraine to be a net contributor to the war on
terror.
• To meet these goals, Ukraine needs to engage in
military transformation, which is the development of a
professional military, obtaining democratic control over
all security stakeholders, and bringing about democratic
professionalism.
• Ukraine has made considerable progress in all three areas of
military reformation, but has made less progress in reforming
its security services. Progress in achieving these goals and
contributing to the defeat of terrorism depends on normalizing
relations with its larger and more powerful neighbor, the
Russian Federation.
• An evaluation of progress in defense reform suggests,
however, that, while the JRRF has the capability and training
for stabilization operations, the Ukrainian military is not yet
ready for more robust peacekeeping tasks.
• Ukraine’s goal of Euro-Atlantic integration, if not wellmanaged, risks damaging further relations with Russia. This
could hamper effective military transformation in Ukraine and
the development of niche capabilities such as peacekeeping
forces.
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• Democratic consolidation and increased democratic oversight
of the military might limit Ukraine’s ability to perform more
strategic peacekeeping roles.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• The U.S. Government and military must recognize the unique
nature of Ukraine’s military transformation and the complex
relationship between the internal and external challenges, and
then tailor programs that encourage military and democratic
transformation and promote good relations with the Russian
Federation.
• The United States and the international community need to
recognize the inherent contradictions in Ukraine’s attempt to
consolidate its democracy. There is a trade-off—a democratically stable Ukraine, which would be a force for stability
in the region, might be less willing to deploy peacekeeping
troops in nontraditional peacekeeping operations, even those
with a UN mandate.
• The United States in particular must work with Ukrainian
forces to develop key leadership skills required by future
commanders in peacekeeping roles. This would include
tailoring courses that deal with the broader challenges of
peace support operations such as effective and decentralized
command. The Defense Academy in Kiev presents courses
for peacekeeper commanders prior to deployment. The
operative assumption here is that commanders undertaking
these courses already have developed key command skills.
However, the case study of Ukrainian peacekeepers in Iraq
presented earlier suggests that this assumption may be illfounded, and that these skills need to be learned earlier in an
officer’s career.
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